No Welcome Mat, No Problem?:  Federal-Question Jurisdiction after Grable by Ryan, Rory M
1No Welcome Mat, No Problem?:  Federal-Question Jurisdiction after Grable 
Rory Ryan1
Abstract
For nearly 20 years, the Supreme Court’s federal-question jurisprudence 
was muddied after the Court’s decision in Merrell-Dow.  Last term, the 
Court issued a much-needed clarification in Grable.  But that clarification 
needs clarification.  In this Article, Professor Ryan endeavors to provide a 
candid synthesis of what the law is after Grable.  While this area is rich 
with debate about what the law should be, a candid post-Grable synthesis 
is needed both to guide courts and to provide a common ground for these 
debates.  Even such a modest task, however, is formidable.  Federal-
question jurisdiction is not a concept that can be viewed without its 
historical and theoretical underpinnings.  And a bald reading of Grable 
does not reveal the nuances that exist, as many years of precedent have 
been synthesized into a new test.  Professor Ryan traces the evolution of 
the meaning of the words “arising under” in the federal-question statute 
up to and through Grable and analyzes the new test in light of history, 
evolution, and policy 
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I.  Introduction.  
 
Federal-question jurisdiction has always been an elusive concept at its boundaries.  
The amorphous, jurisdiction-granting words of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 are: “The district courts 
shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or 
treaties of the United States.”2 The key words, “arising under,” have proven to be two of 
the more versatile words in the English language.  They mean different things in different 
contexts.  And over time, they have evolved to mean very different things even in the 
same contexts.  Last term, in Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering 
 
2 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  
3& Manufacturing,3 the Supreme Court issued the latest edition of its “arising under” 
dictionary.  This Article is a guide to that edition.  I will attempt to provide a framework 
for answering the is-there-federal-question-jurisdiction question.  While there is much to 
debate regarding what the law in this area should be, this Article avoids that question, and 
instead endeavors to synthesize what the law is after Grable.
Having clarified the Article’s purpose, I must offer some preliminary warnings.  
Federal-question jurisdiction cannot be understood without its theoretical and historical 
contexts.   While many cases present easily identifiable federal questions, the boundaries 
of federal-question jurisdiction “require sensitive judgments about congressional intent, 
judicial power, and the federal system.”4 And while the new edition modifies the 
definition of “arising under,” the cases decided under earlier editions retain much 
significance, and understanding them is crucial to understanding Grable’s new four-
prong edition.  Accordingly, I will trace the evolution of the doctrine and policy, which 
ultimately must shape the interpretation of the Grable edition.  I will explore, in depth, 
the four-prong test, synthesizing the earlier case law and highlighting ambiguities and 
potential problems within the new test.  Ultimately, I will conclude that the Grable 
edition admirably answers more questions than it creates.  
 This Article proceeds in four additional parts. In Part II, I will outline the basic 
structure of the subject-matter-jurisdiction inquiry.5 There, I will explain the structure of 
Article III of the Constitution, the significance of its use of the words “arising under,” 
and the interrelationship between those words in the Constitution and the same words in § 
1331.    In Part III, I will trace the pre-Grable interpretation of the federal-question statute 
 
3 125 S. Ct. 2363 (2005). 
4 Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 810 (1986).  
5 Part II, infra at   
4to provide the necessary context for understanding Grable at more than a superficial 
level.6 In Part IV, I will detail the Grable decision and how it both arrived at and applied 
its new four-prong test.7 Finally, in Part V, I will analyze the four-prong test and provide 
a framework for applying it after Grable.8
II.  The basic structure:  how Article III and § 1331 interrelate. 
 Article III, § 2 provides that the judicial power “shall extend” to certain categories 
of cases or controversies, known as the heads of jurisdiction.9 Despite the “shall extend” 
language, Article III is not a self-executing grant of jurisdiction to the lower federal 
courts.10 That is, Article III confers no jurisdiction on the federal district courts.11 To 
have subject-matter jurisdiction, the federal district courts need congressional 
authorization.12 What purpose, then, do the heads of jurisdiction serve in Article III, § 2?  
The heads of jurisdiction define the limits on Congress’s power to confer jurisdiction on 
 
6 Part III, infra at  
7 Part IV, infra at  
8 Part V, infra at  
9 “The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the 
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority; --to all Cases 
affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; --to all Cases of admiralty and maritime 
Jurisdiction; --to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party’ –to Controversies between two 
or more States; --between a State and Citizens of another State [modified by the 11th Amendment]; --
between Citizens of different States; --between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of 
different States, and between a State, of the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.”  U.S. 
Const. art. III, § 2.  
10 Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 478 U.S. at 807;  Cary v. Curtis, 3 How. 236, 11 L.Ed. 576 (1845). 
11 Id.; John T. Parry, No Appeal:  The U.S.-U.K. Supplementary Extradition Treaty’s Effort to Create 
Federal Jurisdiction, 25 LOYOLA L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 543, 561 (Summer 2003).   In contrast to 
lower federal court jurisdiction, Article III’s grants of jurisdiction to the Supreme Court are self-executing.  
Lawrence Gene Sager, Constitutional Limitations on Congress’s Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of 
the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 23-24 (1981).  
12 Cary, 3 How. at 245 (“[T]he judicial power of the United States, although it has its origins in the 
Constitution, is (except in enumerated instances, applicable exclusively to this court) dependent for its 
distribution and organization, and for the modes of its exercise, entirely upon the action of Congress, who 
possess the sole power of creating the tribunals (inferior to the Supreme Court), for the exercise of the 
judical power, and of investing them with jurisdiction either limited or concurrent, or exclusive, and of 
withholding jurisdiction for them in the exact degress and character which to Congress may seem proper 
for the public good.”); see Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986) (“Federal 
Courts are not courts of general jurisdiction; they have only the power that is authorized by Article III of 
the Constitution and those statutes enacted by Congress pursuant thereto.”).   
5the federal courts.13 In other words, Article III, § 2 defines the maximum reach of the 
federal judicial power—it sets the limits on what jurisdiction Congress can give its 
courts.14 When Congress confers jurisdiction on the federal courts, it must be able to 
point to one of the heads of jurisdiction as authorizing that particular grant.   Thus, 
determining subject-matter jurisdiction is a two-step process.  First, did Congress confer 
jurisdiction?  And second, if so, did Article III, § 2 give Congress the power to confer 
that jurisdiction?     
 Rarely will jurisdictional fights involve the second step.  Modern federal-question 
litigation almost always concerns the scope of the congressional authorization, § 1331.  
This Article also focuses on the meaning of the congressional authorization.   But 
because § 1331 and Article III, § 2 use the same “arising under” phrase, distinguishing 
the two steps is needed, if for no other reason than to prevent confusion.   
Article III, § 2 gives Congress broad power to confer jurisdiction in cases “arising 
under” the Constitution and laws of the United States.15 The Constitution allows 
Congress to confer jurisdiction on the federal courts when a federal issue is merely a 
potential ingredient of the case—even if the federal issue is not likely to be disputed.16 
Osborn v. Bank of the United States illustrates the breadth of congressional power.17 In 
Osborn, Congress had authorized federal jurisdiction over all suits by or against the Bank 
 
13 Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441 (1850) (“The Constitution has defined the limits of the judicial power of the 
United States, but has not prescribed how much of it shall be exercised” by the lower federal courts.);  see 
Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 136 (1989); Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 
491 (1983).   
14 See Julian Velasco, Congressional Control Over Federal Court Jurisdiction:  A Defense of the Traditional 
View, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 671, 709-710 (1996).  
15 ”The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the 
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority.”  U.S. Const. 
art. III, § 2. 
16 Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 738, 823 (1824). 
17 Id.  
6of the United States.18 The Court held that Congress had the authority, under the “arising 
under” head of jurisdiction, to confer federal jurisdiction even in a garden-variety breach-
of-contract suit against the Bank, because federal law created the Bank and its right to 
contract, and because a question about that authority could potentially be raised in any 
suit against the Bank.19 While the Supreme Court has never defined the precise 
boundaries of this power, 20 Osborn and its progeny demonstrate an impressive breadth.  
The federal-question statute uses the same “arising under” phrase, but the statute 
requires far more than federal law being  merely a potential ingredient in the case.21 
Although much of the legislative history suggests that Congress may have intended to 
confer all its power when it passed § 1331 and thus extend jurisdiction to every case in 
which federal law forms a potential ingredient, 22 the Court has construed the language 
 
18 Id. at 817. 
19 Id. at 824. 
20 Scholars have long debated a theory of so-called “protective jurisdiction.” E.g. Eric J Segall, Article III 
as a Grant of Power:  Protective Jurisdiction, Federalism, and the Federal Courts, 54 FLA. L. REV. 361 (July 
2002);  Linda S. Mullenix, Complex Litigation Reform and Article III Jurisdiction, 59 FORDHAM. L. REV.
169 (1990).  The Supreme Court has been less interested than have the scholars.  See Mesa, 489 U.S. at 137 
(“We have, in the past, not found the need to adopt a theory of ‘protective jurisdiction’ to support Art. III 
‘arising under’ jurisdiction, and we do not see any need for doing so here.”) (internal citations omitted).  
21 See Franchise Tax Bd. of State of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 8 
n.8 (1983) (The statute's “arising under” language tracks similar language in art. III, §2 of the Constitution, 
which has been construed as permitting Congress to extend federal jurisdiction to any case of which federal 
law potentially “forms an ingredient,” and its limited legislative history suggests that the 44th Congress 
may have meant to “confer the whole power which the Constitution conferred,” 2 Cong. Rec. 4986 (1874) 
(remarks of Sen. Carpenter). Nevertheless, we have only recently reaffirmed what has long been 
recognized-that “Article III ‘arising under’ jurisdiction is broader than federal-question jurisdiction under § 
1331.”) (internal citations omitted).  
22 Id.; See 2 Cong. Rec. 4896 (1874) (remarks of Sen. Carpenter) (“The Constitution says that certain 
judicial powers shall be conferred upon the United States. The Supreme Court of the United States in an 
opinion delivered by Judge Story—I do not recollect now in what celebrated case it was, whether Cohens 
vs. Virginia or some of those famous cases—said that it is the duty of the Congress of the United States to 
vest all the judicial power of the Union in some Federal Court, and if they may withhold a part of it they 
may withhold all of it and defeat the Constitution by refusing or simply omitting to carry its provisions into
execution. . .This bill gives precisely the power which the Constitution confers—nothing more, nothing 
less. . .[I]t seems to me that when Congress ought to do what the Supreme Court said more than forty years 
ago it was the duty to do, vest the power which the Constitution confers in some court of original 
jurisdiction.”).
7much more narrowly.23 The next Part explores the evolving meaning of the phrase 
“arising under” in § 1331.   
 
III.  Section 1331 and “arising under” before Grable.
Grable clarified (or perhaps more accurately, modified) the test for when a case 
“arises under” federal law under § 1331.  But Grable’s test cannot be fully understood 
without appreciating what came before.  Many of the pre-Grable cases remain important 
because they have been synthesized into the Grable test or address jurisdictional issues 
unchanged by Grable. Others are simply required to understand some of Grable’s 
language and rationale.  
 This section proceeds in two parts.  First, I will briefly outline the starting place 
for all § 1331 inquiries: the well-pleaded-complaint rule.  The well-pleaded-complaint 
rule tells the court where to look to determine if a case arises under federal law.  Grable 
does not directly impact this rule.  And second, I will outline the underlying question that 
Grable addressed—what is the court looking for in the well-pleaded complaint?  In other 
words, what kinds of federal issues in a well-pleaded complaint make the case one that 
arises under federal law?   
 A.  Where to look:  the well-pleaded-complaint rule.  
 The well-pleaded-complaint rule is a where-to-look rule.  Under § 1331, a case 
does not “arise under” federal law unless the “plaintiff’s statement of his own cause of 
action shows that it is based upon” the Constitution or laws of the United States.24 This 
 
23 Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986); Franchise Tax Board v. 
Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1 (1983); Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust 
Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921).  
24 Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908). 
8rule encapsulates two issues.  First, to determine federal-question jurisdiction, a court can 
only look to the plaintiff’s complaint, not to counterclaims or other claims by 
defendants.25 And second, the court can only look at the well-pleaded part of the 
plaintiff’s complaint.  The well-pleaded part includes only that part that is necessary to 
maintain a viable cause of action.26 It includes neither defenses the plaintiff anticipates 
nor the plaintiff’s responses to those anticipated defenses.27 
The leading case is Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mottley,28 which 
involved a breach-of-contract claim brought in federal court.  The Mottleys were injured 
on a railroad.  They then settled their negligence claims with the railroad and obtained 
lifetime passes on the railroad in exchange for their release.  The railroad stopped 
honoring the passes when Congress enacted a federal statute prohibiting certain free-
transportation contracts.29 The Mottleys sued the railroad in federal court, seeking 
specific performance of the free-passes contract.30 In their complaint, the Mottleys 
argued that the federal statute did not apply to their contract, and, alternatively, that if the 
statute did apply, it was unconstitutional.31 Although the Mottleys’ allegations showed 
that, “very likely, in the course of litigation, a question under the Constitution would 
arise, they [did] not show that the suit, that is, the plaintiff’s original cause of action, 
 
25 Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830-31 (2002). 
26 Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112 (1936); Bar J Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. W. Mobile N. 
Mexico, 2005 WL 3663689, at *6 (D.N.M.) (“[A]ny statements in the complaint which go beyond a 
statement of the plaintiff’s claim . . . are to be disregarded in deciding whether federal-question jurisdiction 
exists.”);  see generally John B. Oakley, Federal Jurisdiction and the Problem of the Litigative Unit: When 
Does What “Arise Under” Federal Law, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1829, 1835 (June 1998).  
27Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Graham, 489 U.S. 838, 841 (1989);  Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 
58, 63 (1987); see Christopher A. Cotropia, Counterclaims, the Well-Pleaded Complaint, and Federal 
Jurisdiction, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 7 (Fall 2004). 
28 211 U.S. 149 (1908).  
29 Id. at 150-51. 
30 Id. at 150. 
31 Id. at 151. 
9arises under the Constitution.”32 Although the suit would likely require the Court to 
construe a federal statute and determine its constitutionality, those questions arose outside 
the well-pleaded complaint.33 The questions appeared in the plaintiff’s complaint, but not 
in the well-pleaded part.34 Rather, those questions appeared only as anticipated defenses 
or responses to anticipated defenses.35 
The well-pleaded-complaint rule survives still, often eliminating federal 
jurisdiction in cases where the principal—or indeed only—contested question involves 
federal law.36 For example, the well-pleaded-complaint rule prevents removal based 
upon the preclusive effect of a federal judgment37 or a federal preemption defense.38 Nor 
is federal jurisdiction properly based on the presence of a counterclaim created by federal 
law, even a compulsory one.39 The Court has also extended the well-pleaded-complaint 
rule to the declaratory-judgment context. 40 
32 Id. at 152. 
33 Id. at 153. 
34 Id. at 153-4. 
35 Id. at 154. 
36 See generally, Michael G. Collins, The Unhappy History of Federal Question Removal, 71 IOWA L. REV.
717 (1986); Richard E. Levy, Comment, Federal Preemption, Removal, and the Well-Pleaded Complaint 
Rule, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 634, 638 (1984) (“the well-pleaded complaint rule withdraws from original 
federal jurisdiction a large number of cases that eventually do turn on the validity of a federal defense, and 
such cases are within the purposes of federal question jurisdiction.”). 
37 Rivet v. Regions Bank of Louisiana, 522 U.S. 470, 477 (1998). 
38 Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1 (1983).  One 
exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule is the complete-preemption doctrine.  As recently 
reformulated, the complete-preemption doctrine allows a defendant to remove a case when the plaintiff 
asserts a state-law claim that falls within the scope of an exclusively federal cause of action.  Such a claim, 
we have learned, is really federal.  See Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 9 (2003).  Justice 
Scalia’s dissent aptly notes the oddity of this “federalize-and-remove” exception to the well-pleaded-
complaint rule.  Id. at 18 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
39 Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 833-34 (2002).  Although 
Vornado was a case interpreting the congressional grant of patent jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1338, the 
analysis applies equally to § 1331.  As the Court noted,  "[i]t would take an unprecedented feat of 
interpretive necromancy to say that §1338(a)'s 'arising under' language means one thing (the well-pleaded-
complaint rule) in its own right, but something quite different (respondent's complaint-or-counterclaim 
rule) when referred to by §1295(a)(1)."  Id. at 834.  See also Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating 
Corp., 486 U.S. 800 (1988). 
40Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. at 10; Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950).  
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 As noted above, Grable doesn’t alter the well-pleaded-complaint rule.  The rule 
still tells us where to look to find the federal issues.  Grable impacts the next step, what 
kind of federal issues in that well-pleaded complaint give rise to federal-question 
jurisdiction.   
B.  What to look for:  the two branches.  
Two distinct branches exist under § 1331.  The first branch is common, 
uncontroversial, and easily applied.  The second branch has created problems since its 
inception.  Unsurprisingly, Grable is a second-branch case.  
The so-called Holmes test covers the first branch, the easy federal-question cases.  
It states that when federal law creates the cause of action that the plaintiff asserts, the 
case “arises under” federal law.41 So if the plaintiff sues under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or 
Section 4 of the Clayton Act,42 jurisdiction is proper under § 1331 because federal law 
created the cause of action.  Similarly, a claim “arises under” federal law when federal 
common law creates the cause of action.43 
Justice Holmes intended his test as one of exclusion.  In his view, a suit arises 
only “under the law that creates the cause of action.”44 The test is as easily applied as it is 
stated.  If state law creates a plaintiff’s cause of action, the case arises only under state 
law, regardless of the presence of federal issues.  And since § 1331 only grants 
jurisdiction in cases that arise under federal law, a state-law-created cause of action could 
never trigger § 1331 jurisdiction.45 The Holmes Test has survived—but only as a test of 
 
41 American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 261 (1916). 
42 15 U.S.C. § 15.  
43 Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 100 (1972) (We see no reason not to give ‘laws’ its natural 
meaning, and therefore conclude that § 1331 jurisdiction will support claims founded upon federal common 
law as well as those of a statutory origin.”) (internal citations omitted).  
44 Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 214-215 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  
45 See id. 
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inclusion. When federal law creates the plaintiff’s cause of action, the case still “arises 
under” federal law.46 Those are branch-one cases.   
Branch two was born when the Court rejected the Holmes test as one of 
exclusion.  In Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., Smith filed a shareholder derivative 
suit under Missouri law in federal district court against a corporation.47 Missouri law 
created a derivative cause of action that allowed shareholders to enjoin corporations from 
purchasing unlawful bonds.48 Smith sought to enjoin the corporation from purchasing 
bonds authorized by the Federal Farm Loan Act of 1916.49 He alleged that those bonds 
were unlawful because the Federal Farm Loan Act was unconstitutional.50 The Act’s 
unconstitutionality was the only theory he offered to support his claim, and indeed was 
the only issue disputed in the case.51 Thus, while Missouri state law created Smith’s 
cause of action, his well-pleaded complaint necessarily raised a question of federal law as 
an element of that state-law claim.  The Court rejected the Holmes test as one of 
exclusion and held that the case arose under federal law.  And thus, the second branch 
was born.  The Holmes test still works as a test of inclusion—when federal law creates 
the plaintiff’s cause of action, the case arises under federal law.  But state law created 
Smith’s cause of action, and yet the suit arose under federal law because there were 
federal issues embedded in the state-law cause of action.   
 
46 Some have mentioned a possible narrow exception where even a claim created by federal law will not 
satisfy § 1331.  See Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 507 (1900).  The case has no modern 
progeny, and Professor Oakley has recently concluded that Shoshone did not actually involve a federally 
created cause of action at all.  Oakley, supra n.26 at ___, n.63. 
47 25 U.S. 180 (1921). 
48 Grable & Sons Metal Prods. v. Darue Engineering & Mfg., 125 S.Ct. 2363, 2367 (2005) (construing 
Smith).
49 Smith, 25 U.S. at 195. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 199. 
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So what types of federal issues embedded in state-law claims make a case arise 
under federal law?  Smith confirmed that there is a second branch, but failed to define its 
boundaries.  In the years that followed, no precise definition appeared.52 Essentially, the 
answer became a pragmatic one based on a certain amount of judicial intuition—the 
presence of a federal issue in a state-law claim made the case arise under federal law 
when the federal court should be empowered to hear it.53 Justice Cardozo wrote that 
“What is needed is something of that common-sense accommodation of judgment to 
kaleidoscopic situations which characterizes the law in its treatment of causation . . . a 
selective process which picks the substantial out of the web and lays the other ones 
aside.” 54 Cardozo’s statement teaches that the federal issue must be “substantial,” a 
requirement that remains today after Grable.
In 1983, in Franchise Tax Board, the Court summarized both branches: 
“Under our interpretations, Congress has given the lower federal courts 
jurisdiction [under § 1331] to hear . . . only those cases in which a well-pleaded 
complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the 
plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on the resolution of a substantial 
question of federal law.”55 
Franchise Tax Board seemed to unequivocally reaffirm the existence of the second 
branch.  Although applying its test still required a kaleidoscope (and perhaps a secret 
decoder ring), Franchise Tax Board taught that an embedded federal issue in a state-law 
 
52 See Paul Mishkin, The Federal “Question” in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157 (1953); 
William Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement That a Case Arise “Directly” Under Federal Law, 
115 U. PA. L. REV. 890 (1967); Linda R. Hirshman, Whose Law Is It, Anyway?  A Reconsideration of 
Federal Question Jurisdiction over Cases of Mixed State and Federal Law, 60 IND. L.J. 17 (1985); David L. 
Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985). 
53 See Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 3562 at 47 (“Rather than attempting a test it 
might be wiser simply to recognize that the existing doctrines as to when a case raises a federal question are 
neither analytical nor entirely logical, and that in the unusual case in which there is a debatable issue about 
federal question jurisdiction, pragmatic considerations must be taken into account.”).  
54 Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 117-18 (1936). 
55 Franchise Tax Board of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S 1, 27-28 
(1983). 
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claim sufficed for federal-question jurisdiction when the federal issue was “necessary” 
and “substantial.”  
 Three years later, the Merrell Dow case56 cast serious doubt upon the existence of 
the second branch, and much ink was spilt by contemporary courts and commentators 
debating just what Merrell Dow did to the scope of federal subject-matter jurisdiction.57 
While Grable recently clarified what Merrell Dow “really” meant, a complete post-
Grable synthesis of the law requires an understanding of that debate.  
 The Merrell Dow facts were not complex.  The plaintiffs were mothers who had 
taken the drug Bendectin during pregnancy and whose children later developed birth 
defects.58 In their state-court petition, plaintiffs alleged six causes of action: negligence, 
gross negligence, fraud, breach of warranty, strict liability, and negligence per se.59 The 
first five causes of action relied entirely on state law,   but the sixth contained a second-
branch, embedded-federal-issue problem.  Negligence per se is, of course, a state-law-
created cause of action.  But that claim involved a federal issue because, as their sole 
basis for proving negligence per se, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants misbranded 
the drug in violation of the Federal Drug and Cosmetic Act (the Drug Act).60 Citing § 
1331 and relying on the Franchise Tax Board decision, the defendants removed the case, 
alleging that a federal issue (construction of the Drug Act), was both necessary and 
 
56 Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986). 
57 E.g., Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Between State and Federal 
Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and the “Martian Chronicles”, 78 VA. L. REV. 1769 (1992); William V. 
Luneberg, Nonoriginalist Interpretation—A Comment on Federal Question Jurisdiction and Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 757 (1987); Note, Mr. Smith Goes to Federal Court: Federal Question 
Jurisdiction over State Law Claims Post-Merrell Dow, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2272 (2002). 
58 Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 805. 
59 Id.  
60 Id. 
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substantial.  Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the issue was necessary but not 
substantial.    
 When the Sixth Circuit examined whether Merrell Dow could remove based upon 
the presence of an embedded federal issue, it held that there was no “necessary” federal 
question.61 In the above-quoted Franchise Tax Board language, the Court had stated that 
the plaintiff’s right to relief must necessarily depend upon the resolution of a question of 
federal law.  Five of the plaintiffs’ six causes of action involved no issue of federal law.  
So, the Sixth Circuit held, the plaintiffs’ right to relief did not necessarily depend upon 
the Drug Act’s construction because they could recover under five different causes of 
action without even referencing federal law. 
 The Supreme Court held that this case didn’t fail at the “necessary” stage.62 
Instead of looking at the plaintiffs’ right to recover in the aggregate, the Court held that 
necessity is determined on a claim-by-claim basis.63 The “necessary” box was checked 
because the negligence per se claim necessarily depended upon a question of federal law, 
even though the plaintiffs asserted other claims.  The Court held that, if the negligence 
per se claim presented a “sufficient federal question, its relationship to other state-law 
claims would be determined by the ordinary principles of [supplemental jurisdiction.]”64 
Part V-A will explore the necessity prong in more detail.65 
Although there was a necessary federal issue, the Court held there was no federal-
question jurisdiction because the federal issue was not “substantial.”  The Court noted 
that the Drug Act did not expressly create a private cause of action, and both parties 
 
61 Id. at 806-7 (construing the Sixth Circuit’s decision). 
62 Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. at 817, n.15 (1986). 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Part V-A, infra p.  
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conceded that the Drug Act did not contain an implied cause of action.66 The Court held, 
over a vigorous dissent, that a “congressional determination that there should be no 
federal remedy for the violation of this federal statute is tantamount to a congressional 
conclusion that the presence of a claimed violation of the statute as an element of a state 
cause of action is insufficiently ‘substantial’ to confer federal-question jurisdiction.”67 
The Court continued:  
The significance of the necessary assumption that there is no federal private cause 
of action thus cannot be overstated.  For the ultimate import of such a conclusion, 
as we have repeatedly emphasized, is that it would flout congressional intent to 
provide a federal remedy for the violation of the federal statute.  We think it 
would similarly flout, or at least undermine, congressional intent to conclude that 
federal courts might nevertheless exercise federal-question jurisdiction and 
provide remedies for violations of that federal statute solely because of the 
violation of the federal statute is said to be [actionable] under state law, rather 
than a federal action under federal law.68 
Many contemporary courts and commentators read this opinion as nearly 
eliminating the second branch.69 In his treatise, after Merrell Dow, Professor 
Chemerinsky altered the Franchise Tax Board test to state:  “A case arises under federal 
law if it is apparent from the face of the plaintiff’s complaint either that the plaintiff’s 
cause of action was created by federal law; or, if the plaintiff’s cause of action is based on 
state law, a federal law that creates a cause of action is an essential component of the 
plaintiff’s claim.”70 
66 Id. at 810-11. 
67 Id. at 814.  Justice Brennan, in dissent, countered (with the weight of the legal academy behind him): 
“Why should the fact that Congress chose not to create a private federal remedy mean that Congress would 
not want there to be federal jurisdiction to adjudicate a state claim that imposes liability for violating the 
federal law?” Id. at 825 (Brennan, J., dissenting);  see generally. Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the 
Allocation of Judicial Business Between State and Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and the “Martian 
Chronicles”, 78 VA. L. REV. 1769, 1794 (1992); Patti Alleva, Prerogative Lost: The Trouble with Statutory 
Federal Question Doctrine After Merrell Dow, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1477, 1524-25 (1991). 
68 Merrell Dow at 812. 
69 See Articles cited supra, n.57. 
70 Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, § 5.2 (3d ed. 1999). 
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 Merrell Dow’s meaning was the subject of much guessing.71 Should it be read to 
implicitly overrule Smith, where jurisdiction existed even though the Federal Farm Loan 
Act did not create a private cause of action?  In Merrell Dow, the Court cited Smith, but
didn’t tell us it was overruled.72 And yet, the Court stated that exercising jurisdiction 
over a second-branch case would “flout, or at least undermine” congressional intent when 
the embedded federal statute did not create a private cause of action.73 Indeed, the Court 
conspicuously noted that this was the “first case” in which it had reviewed a second-
branch case since it had reformulated its implied-cause-of-action test.74 This conspicuous 
note seemed to signal that the law was indeed changing.  And the lower courts were left 
without significant guidance, resulting in divergent views over how much of branch two 
was left after the Merrell Dow massacre.75 
Several circuits subsequently held that the second branch only covered cases 
where federal law provided a parallel private cause of action.76 For example, suppose a 
state consumer-protection statute provides for treble damages and provides that violations 
 
71 See supra, n.57. 
72 Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at  814 n.12.  In fact, the Court also noted the “widely perceived ‘irreconcilable’ 
conflict” between Smith and Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad Co. 291 U.S. 205 (1934), where no 
jurisdiction was found in a similar embedded-issue case. 
73 Id. at 812. 
74 Id. at 811. 
75 See infra, notes 76-77.  Indeed, a 2002 Harvard Law Review Note, revealed an amazing statistic.  
Between 1994 and 2002, the circuit courts heard 69 second-branch cases and reversed the lower court in 45 
of those cases.  Note, Mr. Smith Goes to Federal Court: Federal Question Jurisdiction over State Law 
Claims Post-Merrell Dow, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2272 (2002). 
76 Zubi v. AT&T Corp., 219 F.3d 220, 223 n.5 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding there can be no federal “jurisdiction 
where Congress has determined that there should be no private cause of action for violation of the federal 
law”); TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 206 F.3d 618, 622 n.2 (6th Cir. 2000) (relying on Merrell Dow and 
Professor Chemerinsky’s distillation of Merrell Dow to require a federal private cause of action); Seinfeld 
v. Austen, 39 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding that “Under Merrell Dow, therefore, ‘if federal law 
does not provide a private right of action, then a state law action based on its violation perforce does not 
raise a ‘substantial’ federal question’”); Sparta Surgical Corp. v. National Ass’n of Securities Dealers, Inc., 
159 F.3d 1209, 1212 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that Merrell Dow does require a § 1331 suit to have as an 
element a federal law that provides a private cause of action); Rogers v. Platt, 814 F.2d 683, 688 (D.C. Cir. 
1987) (finding that in Merrell Dow, “a closely divided Court held that if Congress affirmatively determines 
that there should be no private federal cause of action that is effectively the end of the matter”). 
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of other specified “tie-in” statutes (both state and federal) are also deemed violations of 
the consumer-protection statute.  Even if one of the tie-in statutes is federal, and even if 
that federal statute creates its own cause of action, a plaintiff seeking treble damages may 
choose to assert that violation under the state statute.  To avoid flouting (or at least 
undermining) congressional intent, some circuits viewed the second branch as only 
encompassing similar circumstances.  
 Other circuits refused to read Merrell Dow so restrictively.  In those circuits, a 
federal issue could still be “substantial” without Congress specifically providing for a 
federal remedy.77 Those cases, however, are difficult to reconcile with Merrell Dow’s 
warning against flouting congressional intent.  Some even suggested that branch two only 
covered embedded constitutional claims because in those situations, there was no 
analogous congressional intent to flout.78 
Even if read to its utmost, the Merrell Dow edition of the “arising under” 
definition did not eliminate the second branch entirely.  But just how much of branch two 
was left?  That was the question Merrell Dow left open and the question answered 
differently by judges and scholars for the twenty years following Merrell Dow. Finally, 
in Grable, the Supreme Court answered, teaching that Merrell Dow was actually decided 
under a previously unarticulated prong to the “arising under” definition.  
77 E.g.,W. 14th St. Commercial Corp. v. 5 W. 14th Owners Corp., 815 F.2d 188, 196 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding 
that “assuming that plaintiffs have no private right of action under [the Federal Condominium and 
Cooperative Abuse Act], we conclude that the federal element in plaintiffs’ state cause of action would still 
be sufficiently substantial to to confer arising under jurisdiction”); Ormet Corp. v. Ohio Pwer Co. 98 F.3d 
799, 807 (4th Cir. 1996);  Long v. Bando Mfg. of Am., Inc., 201 F.3d 754, 759 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding that 
Merrell Dow “clearly left open the possibility of federal jurisdiction even in the absence of an express or 
implied federal cause of action”);  Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1050, 1056 (9th 
Cir. 1997) (rejecting the notion that a federal cause of action as being required as “constru[ing] federal 
question jurisdiction and the [Indian Gaming Regulatory Act] too narrowly and underestimate[ing] the 
federal interest at stake”). 
78 See Prerogative Lost:  The Trouble with Statutory Federal-Question Jurisdiction after Merrell-Dow, 52 
OHIO ST. L. J. 1477, ____ n. 186 (1991) (outlining competing views on this theory).  
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IV.  Grable’s modified definition. 
 Grable was a second-branch case involving an embedded federal tax issue within 
a state quiet-title claim. 79 To satisfy a tax delinquency, the IRS seized some of Grable’s 
real property.80 The IRS sold the property to Darue and gave Darue a quitclaim deed.81 
Five years later, Grable brought a quiet-title action against Darue in state court.82 While 
Grable conceded that it had received actual notice of the sale, Grable claimed that 
Darue’s record title was invalid because the IRS had not strictly complied with the 
applicable notice provisions,83 which Grable contended required personal service.  Darue 
removed the case to federal court, arguing that Grable’s quiet-title claim, while created 
by state law, contained an embedded federal issue (the construction of the federal tax 
statute’s notice provision).84 
The Supreme Court began by reaffirming the second branch’s vitality.  The Court 
noted that the federal-question statute is “invoked by and large by plaintiffs pleading a 
cause of action created by federal law.”85 But, the Court continued, there is “another 
longstanding, if less frequently encountered, variety of federal ‘arising under’ 
jurisdiction, this Court having recognized for nearly 100 years that in certain cases 
federal-question jurisdiction will lie over state-law claims that implicate significant 
federal issues.”86 The Court categorized Smith as the “classic example” of a second-
branch case and proceeded to reaffirm the second branch’s existence.87 But Merrell 
 
79 Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Mfg., 125 S.Ct. 2363 (2005). 
80 Id. at 2366. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 26 U.S.C. § 6335.  
84 Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Mfg., 125 S.Ct. 2363, 2366 (2005). 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 2366-67. 
87 Id. at 2367.  
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Dow, which had sparked so much debate, loomed in the background.  The Grable 
opinion synthesized the second-branch cases, settled the debate over Merrell Dow, and 
provided a new definition for second-branch cases:  Jurisdiction is proper in a second-
branch case when a “state-law claim necessarily raise[s] a stated federal issue, actually 
disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any 
congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.”88 
The new definition quoted above consists of four prongs: (1) necessity; (2) 
actually disputed; (3) substantiality; and (4) disruptiveness.  The first three existed before 
Grable and the fourth represents the Court’s view of what Merrell Dow really meant.  
Below, I will detail how the Court applied the test to find jurisdiction proper in Grable.
Then, in Part V, I will evaluate the four prongs in the post-Grable world.  
 The Court easily concluded that Grable’s claim passed the necessity and actually 
disputed prongs. Grable’s claim necessarily raised the federal tax issue because the state 
law required Grable to specify the facts establishing the superiority of its title, and the 
only basis Grable had to claim a superior title was the IRS’s failure to give personal 
notice of the property’s sale.89 And the federal issue was actually disputed; indeed, the 
Court noted, the meaning of the tax statute appeared to be the only legal or factual issue 
contested in the case.90 While Grable did not implicate any difficult issues involving the 
first two prongs, Part V explores them in more depth.91 
88 Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Mfg., 125 S.Ct. 2363, 2368 (2005). 
89 Id.  
90 Id.   
91 Part V, infra p.  
20
 The Court also concluded that the federal tax issue was substantial.  The tax issue 
was an “important issue of federal law that…belong[ed] in federal court.”92 The Court 
noted that the government has a strong interest in prompt and efficient tax collection and 
that the “ability of the IRS to satisfy its claims from the property of delinquents requires 
clear terms of notice to allow buyers like Darue to satisfy themselves that the Service has 
touched the bases necessary for good title.”93 Thus, the Court held, the government had 
“a direct interest in the availability of a federal forum to vindicate its own administrative 
action, and buyers may find it valuable to come before judges used to federal tax 
matters.” 94 
Finally, the Court turned to the fourth prong, disruptiveness.  As noted above, the 
disruptiveness prong is the new part of the test, and it represents the Court’s view of what 
Merrell Dow really meant.  Recall Merrell Dow, where the Court found no federal-
question jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ negligence per se claim, which contained the 
embedded Drug Act issue.  The Merrell Dow Court (we thought) resolved the case at the 
substantiality prong because the Drug Act did not create its own private right of action:  
“[A] congressional determination that there should be no federal remedy for the violation 
of [a] federal statute is tantamount to a congressional conclusion that the presence of a 
claimed violation of a federal statute as an element of a state cause of action is 
insufficiently ‘substantial’ to confer federal-question jurisdiction.”95 But Grable teaches 
that Merrell Dow is not really a substantiality case at all.  In Grable, the Court noted that 
the absence of a private right of action under the Drug Act affected the Merrell Dow 
92 Id. 
93 Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Mfg., 125 S.Ct. 2363, 2368 (2005). 
94 Id. 
95 Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 814 (1986). 
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result in two ways.  First, it was worth “some” consideration in the assessment of 
substantiality.   But its “primary importance,” we now know, is found in the 
disruptiveness prong.96 
We now know, from Grable, that the Merrell Dow Court saw the missing Drug 
Act right of action “not as a missing federal door key, always required, but as a missing 
welcome mat, required in the circumstances when exercising federal jurisdiction” would 
disrupt the congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial 
responsibilities.97 Because finding jurisdiction over the negligence per se claim would 
have “attracted a horde of original filings and removal cases raising other state claims 
with embedded federal issues,” a welcome mat was required.98 
No welcome mat was required in Grable because allowing jurisdiction over the 
quiet-title claim would not be disruptive, as it would have been in Merrell Dow.
Although Congress “indicated ambivalence by providing no private right of action to 
Grable, it is the rare state quiet title action that involves contested issues of federal law.  
Consequently, jurisdiction over actions like Grable’s would not materially affect, or 
threaten to affect, the normal currents of litigation.”99 
Thus, the Court concluded that jurisdiction was proper under the second branch 
because Grable’s state-law claim necessarily raised a federal tax issue, which was 
actually disputed and substantial.   And in what is Grable’s addition to the “arising 
under” dictionary, allowing jurisdiction over quiet-title claims with embedded tax issues 
 
96 Grable, 125 S.Ct. at 2370. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 2371.  
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is not disruptive enough to require a welcome mat.  The next Part analyzes the four 
prongs in greater depth.  
 
V.  Applying the new definition. 
 As noted above, second-branch cases now involve a four-prong jurisdictional 
inquiry.  When a state-law claim contains an embedded federal issue, the federal issue 
must be: (1) necessary; (2) actually disputed; (3) substantial; and (4) accompanied by a 
welcome mat, if exercising jurisdiction would be disruptive.  
 A.  Necessity.  
 A state-law claim “must necessarily raise a stated federal issue.”100 The necessity 
prong requires a distinction between claims and theories.  Again, recall Merrell Dow.
There, the Supreme Court rejected the Sixth Circuit’s holding that the embedded Drug 
Act issue was not “necessary.”101 In Franchise Tax Board, the Court had stated that the 
plaintiff’s right to relief must necessarily depend upon federal law.102 The Sixth Circuit 
applied that language to the Merrell Dow plaintiffs and concluded that because the 
plaintiffs could have recovered on five separate claims that involved no issues of federal 
law, the plaintiffs’ right to relief did not necessarily depend upon federal law.  The 
Supreme Court rejected this narrow view of necessity and concluded that federal law 
need only form a necessary element of one of the plaintiff’s claims.  Whether jurisdiction 
is proper over the remaining claims is determined by principles of supplemental 
 
100 Id. at 2368. 
101 Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 817 n.15 (1986). 
102 Franchise Tax Board of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S 1, 20 (1983).  
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jurisdiction.103 Because the plaintiffs’ negligence per se claim necessarily depended on 
the Drug Act, the necessary prong was satisfied.  
 But let’s change the Merrell Dow facts slightly.  Suppose the plaintiffs had 
asserted two theories to support their negligence per se claims, one alleging the violation 
of the Drug Act and another alleging the violation of a state statute.  Then, would federal 
law form a necessary element of that claim?  The answer is probably not, though 
distinguishing claims from theories is not always clear.   
 The claims-versus-theories distinction originated in Christianson v. Colt 
Industries Operating Corp.104 Although Christianson was decided in a different context, 
many courts have applied its reasoning in § 1331 cases.  The issue in Christianson was 
whether the Federal Circuit had jurisdiction over an appeal.  The Federal Circuit has 
jurisdiction over appeals from final district-court decisions when the district court had 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1338.105 Section 1338 provides that “the district courts 
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress 
relating to patents.”106 The Court noted that both § 1338 and § 1331 contained the terms 
“arising under” and held that linguistic consistency demanded that the terms be construed 
similarly.107 Thus, the Court evaluated whether the plaintiffs’ claims necessarily raised 
an issue of patent law.  
 The plaintiffs had asserted two antitrust claims under the Sherman Act: a 
monopolization claim under § 2 and a group-boycott claim under § 1.108 The plaintiffs 
 
103 Merrell Dow at 817, n. 15. 
104 486 U.S. 800 (1988). 
105 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2000).   
106 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2000).  
107 Christianson, 486 U.S. at 807; Accord Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., 
535 U.S. 826, 833-34 (2002); see Note 39, supra.
108 Christianson, 486 U.S. at 810.  
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had alleged alternative theories to support each claim. But not all of the theories involved 
the patent laws.109 The Court noted that federal jurisdiction focuses on claims, not 
theories.110 A claim arises under the patent laws only if a question involving the patent 
laws is necessary to that claim.  Accordingly, a “claim supported by alternative theories 
in the complaint may not form the basis for §1338(a) jurisdiction unless patent law is 
essential to each of those theories.”111 Ultimately, the Court held that because the 
plaintiffs’ claims were each supported by alternative theories unrelated to the patent laws, 
the patent laws were not necessary to the claims, and the case did not arise under the 
patent laws.112 
Because of the Court’s focus upon linguistic consistency with the term “arising 
under,” it is unsurprising lower courts have extended this test to the necessity prong of 
the second-branch federal-question test.  For example, in Willy v. Coastal Corp., the 
plaintiff asserted a state-law wrongful-discharge claim.113 The plaintiff alleged that he 
was fired because he refused to violate various state and federal environmental and 
securities laws.114 The Court characterized the plaintiff’s claim (wrongful discharge) as 
relying upon at least two alternative theories: first, that the plaintiff was fired for refusing 
to violate federal law; and second, that he was fired for refusing to violate state laws.  
Relying on Christianson, the Fifth Circuit concluded that jurisdiction was improper under 
 
109 Id.  
110 Id. at 810. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. (“The patent-law issue, while arguably necessary to at least one theory under each claim, is not 
necessary to the overall success of either claim.”). 
113 855 F.2d. 1160, 1162 (5th Cir. 1988). 
114 Id. 
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the second branch because federal law was not a necessary element of the state-law 
claim.115 
But distinguishing claims from theories is not always easy.  For example, in 
Merrell Dow, the Court held that the Drug Act was a necessary element of the plaintiff’s 
negligence per se claim.  The plaintiff had also asserted a vanilla negligence claim, but 
the Court treated negligence per se and negligence as different claims, and thus federal 
law only had to be necessary to one of the claims.  Had the Court treated negligence as 
the claim and negligence per se as one of the theories supporting the claim, the claim 
would have failed the necessity test because the plaintiffs’ vanilla negligence claims had 
nothing to do with federal law.  
While the lines between theories and claims are not entirely clear, several 
principles, which can be synthesized from the discussed cases, guide the inquiry.  First, 
surely whether federal law is necessary should not depend upon how the plaintiff 
numbers the counts in the complaint.  Suppose a plaintiff sharing the same claims as the 
Willy plaintiff wants into federal court.  Federal jurisdiction cannot depend upon how that 
plaintiff numbers the counts.  It should be immaterial whether the plaintiff separately 
numbers his wrongful-discharge counts or whether the complaint contains only one 
Roman Numeral within which the plaintiff asserts all reasons supporting wrongful 
discharge.  While many jurisdictional principles depend upon the plaintiff being the 
master of the complaint, which issues qualify for second-branch treatment should not 
depend on the complaint’s organization.  The second-branch inquiry is designed to select 
claims that, while created by state law, deserve a federal forum.  The necessity prong is 
one step in that inquiry, and allowing the plaintiff to manipulate the outcome by mere 
 
115 Id. at 1171; Accord, Rains v. Criterion Sys., Inc., 80 F.3d 339, 346 (9th Cir. 1996) (following Willy).  
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numbering would be inconsistent with a process that is supposed to involve selection of 
worthy federal issues through a “common-sense accommodation of judgment to 
kaleidoscopic situations.”116 
The second principle that guides the necessity inquiry is: When a plaintiff asserts 
different ways in which a defendant violated a particular section of a statute, the 
allegations under that section form a single claim, and the ways in which the defendant is 
alleged to have violated that section are theories, all of which must depend upon federal 
law to satisfy the necessary prong.  For example, in Christianson, though the plaintiff 
alleged different ways in which the defendant violated the group-boycott provision of § 1  
the Sherman Act, the court treated those allegations as involving a single group-boycott 
claim supported by alternative theories.117 Similarly, in Dixon v. Coburg Dairy, Inc., the 
Fourth Circuit rejected jurisdiction.118 There, the plaintiff asserted a violation of a South 
Carolina statute that made it “unlawful for a person to discharge a citizen from 
employment or occupation because of political opinions or the exercise of political rights 
and privileges guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of the United States or by the 
Constitution and laws of South Carolina.”119 The plaintiff, who had been fired for 
bringing a toolbox to work with a Confederate battle-flag decal, asserted that his firing 
violated the law in three ways:  it violated the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, South Carolina public policy, and the South Carolina Constitution.120 
Although the plaintiff asserted these theories in “separate counts” of his complaint, the 
Court correctly treated the statutory wrongful-discharge claim as a single claim and 
 
116 Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U.S.109 (1936). 
117 Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Co., 486 U.S. 800, 810 (1988). 
118 369 F.3d 811 (4th Cir. 2004). 
119 Id. at 814-15. 
120 Id. 
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rejected jurisdiction because federal law was not essential to all of the theories supporting 
that claim.121 
Third, a plaintiff who asserts violations of different statutory sections, even within 
the same statute, asserts multiple claims, only one of which must necessarily depend 
upon federal law.  Again looking to Christianson, the plaintiff alleged violations of two 
sections of the Sherman Act.122 The Court construed the complaint as stating two 
claims—one based on each section—not merely one Sherman Act claim.  To satisfy the 
necessity prong, resolving the question of federal law must be necessary to all the 
theories supporting one claim.123 
While distinguishing between common-law claims and theories can potentially be 
more difficult, most cases are not.  For example, other courts have followed Willy and 
determined that wrongful discharge is a single claim, and reasons why the discharge was 
wrongful are theories, all of which must depend upon federal law to satisfy the necessity 
prong.124 Similarly, if a plaintiff invokes multiple statutes as establishing a duty for 
negligence per se, those different statutes provide different theories, and if even one is a 
state statute, federal law cannot be a necessary element of the negligence per se claim. 
Additionally, Merrell Dow provides a basis for analogy when the plaintiff asserts closely 
related grounds of recovery.  Recall that, there, the Court construed negligence and 
negligence per se as different claims, only one of which had to necessarily depend upon 
 
121 Id. at 818. 
122 Christianson, 486 U.S. at 810 (“Framed in these terms, our resolution of the jurisdictional issue in this 
case is straightforward. Petitioners’ antitrust count can readily be understood to encompass both a 
monopolization claim under § 2 of the Sherman Act and a group-boycott claim under § 1.  The patent-law 
issue, while arguably necessary to at least one theory under each claim, is not necessary to the overall 
success of either claim.”). 
123 Id. at 810. 
124 E.g. Rains v. Criterion Systems, Inc. 80 F.3d 339, 346-7 (9th Cir. 1996). 
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federal law.125 A more questionable distinction appears in a recent case where the 
plaintiff sued a cable company for breach of contract. 126 In that case, the contract 
obligated the cable company to disclose and charge rates “subject to applicable law.”  
The plaintiff asserted that the cable company breached the contract because it violated a 
federal statute and a state statute.  The Court held that the plaintiff’s complaint contained 
two separate breach-of-contract claims, even though both relied upon the same contract 
and indeed the same provision.127 
In summary, the necessity prong is determined on a claim-by-claim basis.  Federal 
law must be a necessary element of a state law claim. So long as that test is satisfied, 
jurisdiction over remaining claims will be determined by principles of supplemental 
jurisdiction.128 But federal law will not be a necessary element of a state-law claim when 
that state-law claim is supported by alternative theories, unless each of those alternative 
theories requires resolution of a federal issue. 
 B.  Actually disputed. 
In a second-branch case, “the federal issue in a state-law claim must actually be in 
dispute to justify federal-question jurisdiction.”129 In Grable, the parties actually 
disputed the tax issue, and indeed it “appear[ed] to be the only legal or factual issue 
contested in [the] case.”130 Thus, the actually disputed prong was satisfied.  The Court 
distinguished an older quiet-title case because, in the older case, the federal statutes on 
which title depended were not subject to any controversy respecting their validity, 
 
125 Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 817 n.15 (1986). 
126 Broder v. Cablevision Systems Corp., 418 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2005). 
127 Id. at 195-96.  
128 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000).  
129 Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Mfg., 125 S.Ct. 2363, 2369 n.3 (2005) 
(citing Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561 (1912)).  
130 Id. at 2368.  
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construction, or effect.131 While the following paragraphs explore this prong in some 
detail, I will ultimately conclude that the requirement that a federal issue be “actually 
disputed” is probably best left to the substantiality prong.  
The Court’s treatment and articulation of this prong raises a timing anomaly.  
Federal-question jurisdiction is usually determined from the face of the plaintiff’s 
complaint.   How can we determine what issues are actually disputed from the plaintiff’s 
complaint?  In Grable, because the case was removed, the Court knew the issue was 
disputed because it could compare the plaintiff’s complaint with the notice of removal.   
But what if the plaintiff had filed the case originally in federal court? Would the Court 
look to the answer or a motion to dismiss?  Suppose plaintiffs file a second-branch case 
in federal court, and suppose a federal issue appears on the face of the well-pleaded 
complaint.  When does the court determine whether the federal issue is actually disputed?  
Does the inquiry end with the answer?  What if the defendant’s answer disputes the 
federal issue, but after discovery progresses, the defendants clarify that they no longer 
dispute the federal issue, but still dispute other issues in the case?  Subject-matter 
jurisdiction can, after all, be raised at any time.  Does the fact that the federal issue is no 
longer disputed divest the court of jurisdiction?   
Unless refined, this prong seems to be in tension with the well-pleaded-complaint 
rule.132 The well-pleaded-complaint rule has its critics,133 but it has survived largely 
because it avoids the type of timing questions raised in the preceding paragraph.    The 
 
131 Id. at 2369 n.3.  
132 See Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 3562 at 27 (“This formulation . . . seems 
seriously deficient as a guide to judgment.  . . .  The test would be difficult, if not impossible, to apply, in 
view of the rule that jurisdiction must be determined from plaintiff’s well-pled complaint.  The complaint 
by itself can hardly disclose on what aspects of the case there will be dispute or controversy.”).  
133 E.g., Donald L Doernberg, There’s Just no Reason for It; It’s Just our Policy:  Why the Well-Pleaded 
Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purposes of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 28 HASTINGS L. J. 597 (1987).  
30
well-pleaded-complaint rule often operates to remove from federal jurisdiction even cases 
that turn entirely on federal law, when the federal issue arises only by way of defense or 
counterclaim.134 It has survived (rightly or wrongly) because of the efficiency that results 
from being able to determine jurisdiction from the outset.  If I were writing on a clean 
slate, I might suggest that federal-question jurisdiction should indeed depend on which 
federal issues are actually disputed.  But a candid synthesis of what the law is must 
account for the ever-looming well-pleaded-complaint rule. 
Given the survival of the well-pleaded-complaint rule, it is difficult to conclude 
that the Court meant, in this narrow context, to direct lower courts to look beyond the 
plaintiff’s complaint.  If a court must wait for an answer to determine whether the issue is 
actually disputed, it is hard to see why a court cannot also look to the answer to find 
substantial, disputed federal defenses.  True, such a distinction would retain some notion 
of the plaintiff being “master of his complaint.”   But the master-of-the-complaint mantra, 
alone, is not so much of a justification as it is a tidy restatement of the result of being able 
to determine jurisdiction from only the plaintiff’s pleadings.  Once federal-question-
jurisdiction inquiries proceed to the defendant’s answer, it is difficult to justify—under 
what’s left of the well-pleaded-complaint rule—declining jurisdiction when an answer 
reveals a substantial federal defense or counterclaim.135 
The Supreme Court’s treatment of this prong suggests no calculated departure 
from the well-pleaded-complaint rule.  Indeed, perhaps the Court means that the federal 
 
134 Id. at 599 (“[E]ven if a case turns upon an important question of federal law, and even if that is the only 
issue in the case, federal question jurisdiction does not exist unless the federal question appears in the 
"right"' place, that is, in the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint.”); see note 36, supra.
135 Unless, of course, the silent distinction is that resorting to the answer in the context of the actually 
disputed prong would decrease the availability of federal-question jurisdiction and in the context of a 
federal defense or counterclaim would increase the availability.  
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issue raised by the plaintiff must be actually (and reasonably) disputable. This rephrasing 
seems more consistent with the Court’s treatment of the older quiet-title case where the 
Court rejected jurisdiction because the “federal statutes on which title depended were not 
subject to any controversy respecting their validity, construction, or effect.”136 If the 
federal issue is settled or the answer to the federal question clear, the presence of a settled 
issue in a state-law cause of action should not trigger federal adjudication.   
Ultimately, this prong is unlikely to create many problems.  While I have 
discussed its possible implications, its impact on second-branch cases will probably be 
negligible.  The prong appeared because the Grable Court had to distinguish some older 
quiet-title cases.  The “actually disputed” language will likely be repeated in headnote 
form, but should not be extended to intrude upon the well-pleaded complaint rule because 
its concerns about federal issues being “not subject to any controversy” are adequately 
addressed by the substantiality prong, discussed below.  If a federal issue is not subject to 
any controversy, it simply is not substantial.   
C.  Substantial.  
The federal issue embedded in the state-law claim must be “substantial.”  No 
precise definition of substantiality is available, and the precedents in this area are 
reconcilable only because the Court has made the “test sufficiently vague and general 
[such that] any set of results can be reconciled” with a post hoc analysis.137 
Substantiality depends upon the nature and importance of the embedded federal 
issue.138 This broad statement about “nature and importance” can be further broken 
 
136 Grable, 125 S.Ct. at 2369 n.3 (emphasis added).  
137 Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 821 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
138 See id. 
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down. Is there a special need for federal expertise in this matter?139 Is there a special 
need for uniformity?140 Will the issue’s resolution reach beyond the instant dispute into 
areas of particular federal concern?141 Along with the nature and importance of the 
federal issue on a national scale, some have suggested that courts should consider how 
prominent the federal issue is in the particular lawsuit, or in other words how “central” 
the federal issue is to the dispute between the parties.142 This centrality concern seems 
better suited for the necessity prong, and indeed considering it within the substantiality 
prong seems to conflict with Merrell-Dow. The necessity prong covers how prominent 
the federal issue must be in a lawsuit.  If the federal issue is necessary to one claim, the 
impact of other claims is determined under the supplemental-jurisdiction statute,143 
including its provisions for declining supplemental jurisdiction when state claims 
predominate.144 
Ultimately, the generalizations are just that, general.145 And Justice Brennan 
seemed to be correct in arguing that the precedents in this area are reconcilable only 
 
139 U.S. Express Lines, Ltd v. Higgins, 281 F.3d  383, 391 (3d Cir. 2002) (embedded admiralty question). 
140 County of Santa Clara v. Astra USA, Inc., 2005 WL 3282245, at * 5 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (noting a special 
need for uniformity in areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction);  see U.S. Express Lines, Ltd v. Higgins, 281 
F.3d  383, 391 (3d Cir. 2002); see Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 826 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
141 E.g., Grable, 125 S.Ct. at 2368; Municipality of San Juan v. Corporacion Para El Fomento Economico 
De La Ciudad Capital, 415 F.3d 145, 148 n.6 (1st Cir. 2005) (“Because the propriety of COFECC's conduct 
turns entirely on its adherence to the intricate and detailed set of federal regulatory requirements, and the 
funds at issue are federal grant monies, we agree with the magistrate judge and district court that 
jurisdiction is proper.”); County of Santa Clara  v. Astra USA, Inc., 2005 WL 3282245, at *5 (a federal 
issue is substantial when it “directly affects the functioning of the federal government).  
142 See Brianna J. Fuller, Developments in the Law: Federal Jurisdiction and Forum Selection, III. Federal 
Question Jurisdiction, 37 LOY L.A. L. REV. 1443, 1455-65 (Summer 2004). 
143 Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 817 n.15 (1986).  
144 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).  
145 See Brianna J. Fuller, Developments in the Law: Federal Jurisdiction and Forum Selection, III. Federal 
Question Jurisdiction, 37 LOY L.A. L. REV. 1443, 1455-65 (Summer 2004). 
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because the standards are general enough to mold to any desired post hoc 
reconciliation.146 This, of course, leaves much room for advocacy.  
The Grable case raises the most compelling of the substantiality concerns.  There, 
resolving the federal tax issue would reach well beyond the parties and impact an area of 
unique federal concern, IRS tax sales.  As one court stated, resolving the federal issue 
would “directly affect the functioning of the federal government.”147 In Grable, the 
Supreme Court noted, the “meaning of the federal tax provision is an important issue of 
federal law that sensibly belongs in federal court.  The Government has a strong interest 
in the prompt and certain collection of delinquent taxes, and the ability of the IRS to 
satisfy its claims from the property of delinquents requires clear terms of notice to allow 
buyers like Darue to satisfy themselves that the Service has touched the bases necessary 
for good title.”148 While stare decisis will, of course, cause any ruling to reach beyond 
the parties, and while presumably all federal laws are important, the Grable case involved 
the government’s interest “in the availability of a federal forum to vindicate its own 
administrative action.”149 Grable also implicated the other two concerns: the need for 
uniformity and federal expertise.  State courts infrequently address federal tax statutes, 
and the need for uniformity was important for the reasons noted above.   
It seems unlikely that the Court will find jurisdiction proper when a federal issue 
is embedded in a garden-variety state tort claim or when the parties incorporate a federal 
law into a private contract.  Before Grable, most courts would have held that such a claim 
 
146 See Almond v. Capital Properties, Inc., 212 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2000) (concluding, in a second-branch case 
that “what remains is the almost unanswerable question of whether the Supreme Court would regard the 
federal issue in this case as sufficiently important to confer “arising under” jurisdiction”).  
147 Astra, 2005 WL 3282245, at *5.  
148 Grable, 125 S.Ct. at 2368.  
149 Id.  
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would not contain a “substantial” federal issue. But after Grable clarified that Merrell 
Dow was not a substantiality case, how the federal issue is incorporated is probably best 
left to the “disruptiveness” prong.  The substantiality prong focuses upon the nature and 
importance of the federal issue.  How that issue is embedded or incorporated does not 
impact the need for uniformity or federal expertise—it impacts whether a welcome mat is 
needed.150 Phrased differently (and perhaps too candidly), the substantiality prong 
appears to represent whether the court thinks this issue deserves federal resolution.  The 
disruptiveness prong accounts for the structural reality that Congress, not the Court, has 
the final say in what issues deserve federal resolution.151 
D.  Disruptiveness.  
 A court cannot exercise second-branch jurisdiction if doing so would disrupt the 
congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.152 The 
disruptiveness prong is a potential veto, grounded in the principle that Congress controls 
federal jurisdiction.  Even when a federal issue is necessary, actually disputed, and 
substantial, jurisdiction is improper if exercising it would be disruptive.153 Exercising 
jurisdiction is disruptive if Congress provided no “welcome mat” when one is needed.   
Not all cases require a welcome mat.     
 First, as a preliminary matter, a welcome mat will rarely exist in a second-branch 
case.  A welcome mat exists when a plaintiff asserts a state-law claim that incorporates a 
federal law, and when Congress provided a federal private right of action for violations of 
the federal law.  A welcome mat is rare in second-branch cases because, ordinarily, when 
 
150 Part V, infra; see Buis v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 2005 WL 3148280, at *3-5 (N.D. Tex. 2005).  
151 Congress’s final say, of course, is regulated by the Constitution.  See Part II, supra.
152 Grable, 125 S.Ct. at 2368.  
153 See Buis, 2005 WL at *5.  
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a case involves a federal statute that creates a cause of action, the plaintiff will have sued 
under that statute.  That is, most cases involving cause-of-action-creating federal statutes 
are first-branch cases.154 But if a welcome mat is present in a second-branch case, the 
disruptiveness inquiry ends, and jurisdiction is proper as long as the other three prongs 
are met.  
 But a welcome mat is not always needed.  The presence of a federal right of 
action for the embedded federal law is not a “missing federal door key, always required,” 
but rather is only a welcome mat, needed when exercising jurisdiction over a class of 
cases would materially disrupt the flow of litigation between state and federal courts.155 
Contrasting Grable and Merrell Dow provides the starting place for determining when 
this welcome mat is needed.  
 In Merrell Dow (as construed by Grable), jurisdiction was absent because hearing 
the case without a welcome mat would have been disruptive.  There, the plaintiffs 
incorporated the Drug Act standard into their negligence per se claim.  The Drug Act did 
not create a private right of action—it contained no welcome mat.156 A welcome mat was 
required because allowing garden-variety tort claims into federal court when they 
incorporated federal law would have “heralded a potentially enormous shift of 
traditionally state cases into federal court.”157 As the Court noted, “One only needed to 
consider the treatment of federal violations generally in garden variety state tort law.  The 
violation of federal statutes and regulations is commonly given negligence per se effect in 
 
154 See Part III-B, supra, suggesting how a second-branch case could involve an embedded federal statute 
that creates a cause of action.  
155 Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Mfg., 125 S.Ct. 2363, 2370 (2005).  
156 Id. at 2371 (construing Merrell Dow).  
157 Grable, 125 S.Ct. at 2370-71 (construing Merrell Dow).  
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state proceedings.”158 When allowing a type of embedded issue into federal court would 
attract a “horde of original filings and removal cases,” federal courts need the 
congressional welcome mat—even if they view the issue as substantial enough to warrant 
federal adjudication.  
 By contrast, in Grable, federal-question jurisdiction was proper despite the 
absence of a welcome mat because only the “rare state quiet title action . . . involves 
contested issues of federal law.”159 Exercising “jurisdiction over actions like Grable’s 
would not materially affect, or threaten to affect the normal currents of litigation.”160 
The disruptiveness prong is based mostly on concerns about separation of powers.  
Congress is responsible for defining the federal courts’ jurisdiction.  Deciding whether 
jurisdiction is proper is supposed to be an exercise in statutory construction.  But until 
Merrell Dow, jurisdiction depended largely upon judicial views of the proper allocation 
of jurisdiction.  Merrell Dow introduced the novel concept of congressional intent into 
the jurisdictional inquiry, but its reasoning was unpersuasive.  Grable found a middle 
ground, requiring express congressional approval before significantly altering the federal 
docket, but allowing jurisdiction in those rare cases where the phrase “arising under” can 
fairly reflect implicit congressional approval based on the impossibility of Congress 
laying welcome mats for the myriad, unforeseeable ways in which federal issues may 
arise.   
 Given the sensitive concerns outlined above, Grable’s proceed-without-a-
welcome-mat holding should not be read too broadly.  Congress can foresee cases 
involving garden-variety tort claims with embedded federal issues and provide the 
 
158 Id. at 2370 (construing Merrell Dow).  
159 Id. at 2371. 
160 Id.  
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welcome mats where appropriate.161 Thus, exercising jurisdiction in cases like 
negligence per se, breach of fiduciary duty, malpractice, and wrongful discharge would 
be disruptive, and cannot genuinely be distinguished from Merrell Dow.162 It would be 
similarly disruptive to allow private parties to incorporate federal standards into their 
contracts and create jurisdiction where Congress has not.163 And importantly, the Court 
clarified that disruptiveness is a veto, separate from concerns about substantiality.  The 
separation-of-powers concerns underlying the disruptiveness prong cannot be alleviated 
by a court’s view about the importance of the federal issue.  Grable teaches that’s a 
separate inquiry. 
VI.  Conclusion. 
 Grable’s new edition confirms that the second branch lives.  Its four-prong test, 
while surely not providing a bright line, creates a workable structure when the steps are 
kept conceptually distinct.   The first prong—necessity—and the well-pleaded-complaint 
rule govern the placement of the federal issue in the case and how prominent the federal 
issue must be in relation to the lawsuit.  The second prong—actually disputed—is more 
conceptually troubling and is properly treated under the substantiality prong.  The third 
prong—substantiality—still allows for judicial consideration of the need for federal 
adjudication, considering the nature and importance of the federal issue.  And the fourth 
 
161 See RA Investment I, LLC v. Smith & Frank Group Services, 2005 WL 3299710, at *3-4 (E.D. Tex. 
2005) (gathering post-Grable cases involving tax issues embedded in tort claims); Cantwell v. Deutsche 
Bank Sec., Inc. No. 3:05-CV-1378-D (N.D.Tex. Sept. 21, 2005).   
162 Sarantino v. American Airlines, Inc., 2005 WL 2406024, at *8 (E.D. Mo. 2005); Accord Leggette v. 
Wash. Mut. Bank FA, 2005 WL 2679699, at *4 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (exercising federal jurisdiction over 
home foreclosure disputes typically governed by private contract and state law portends a significant 
transfer of judicial responsibilities from state to federal courts.”); State of Wisc. v. Abbot Laboratories, 390 
F. Supp. 2d 815, 823 (W.D. Wis. 2005) (“By contrast, the present case is one of many that have been filed 
by states across the country concerning pharmaceutical companies’ alleged fraud in price-setting.”). 
163 Buis, 2005 WL at *5.  
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prong—disruptiveness—is a possible veto, grounded in the notion that Congress, not the 
courts, controls federal jurisdiction.  This latter prong requires restraint.  It is separate 
from the substantiality determination and requires judicial deference to Congress’s 
judgment about the proper allocation of the federal judicial power.    
Unless the second branch is entirely eliminated,164 complete clarity in this area is 
unobtainable.  If adhered to faithfully, Grable will result in few second-branch cases 
properly within § 1331.  Whether that result is desirable can (and surely will) be debated.  
But the Grable edition admirably answers more questions than it creates and provides a 
reasonable structure for the inquiry.  This clarity is a welcome change to the post-Merrell 
Dow world. 
 
164 See Grable, 125 S.Ct. at 2371-72 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting an openness to consider a return to 
the Holmes test as one of exclusion).  I view such an elimination extremely unlikely.  Such a marked 
departure from a construction of § 1331 would require an inquiry into the meaning of § 1331, which would 
likely reveal an implausible answer—that Congress probably intended to extend jurisdiction to the 
constitutional maximum.  
